



**Claims about the effectiveness of the U.S. military's proposed "missile defense" plans for Guam should be treated with skepticism.**

**MEDIA RELEASE**

February 4, 2024 (Hagåtña, Guam) The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense' Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) [annual unclassified report has been released](#) with significant implications for the U.S. military's "missile defense" plans in Guam. The DOT&E conducts operational and live fire test and evaluation activities for the U.S. Department of Defense weapons systems and annually publishes its review. A classified version of the report is usually released late in the year of record.

This recent technical report from the U.S. Defense Department makes clear that the technology being talked about for Guam is not ready for prime time. The military's proposal for an Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (EIAMDS) is lined up for direct criticism in the latest DOT&E report. Even the THAAD, which is already here, is portrayed as something far less than is being promoted by the military in Guam.

Robert Underwood, PCIS Chair

With respect to the EIAMDS, the testing and evaluation report notes:

The Army as the lead Service, with MDA and the Navy, is currently *developing a concept* for a persistent, 360-degree, layered and integrated air and missile defense capability for the defense of Guam. This concept involves interoperability and coordination between multiple assets defending against cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats. The proposed architecture is made of both new and existing components in close proximity and with overlapping areas of regard. This presents *a significant integration and test planning challenge*. DOT&E assesses that *the current test strategy needs significant further development to be adequate*. An agile test program that fully explores interoperability and *engagement planning through ground testing, tracking exercises, and intercept flight testing is warranted*. (emphasis provided) p.340

The report does identify areas in which missile defense is effective, but in nearly all cases systems are deemed to generally be effective against and a small number of simple threats. Specifically,

The regional/theater MDS (*Missile Defense System*) has demonstrated a capability to defend the USINDOPACOM...*from a small number of medium- or intermediate-range ballistic*

*missile threats with ranges less than 4,000 kilometers, and from representative raids against SRBM threats. (emphasis provided) p.340*

THAAD has demonstrated the capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles of varying types (short- to intermediate-range) inside or outside the earth's atmosphere during the terminal phase of flight, although the flight testing and M&S (*Modelling and Simulation*) still need to address more complex engagement conditions and realistic raid scenarios. In FY23, the MDA indefinitely postponed a planned THAAD flight test due to the operational status of the AN/TPY-2 radar. The MDA is now planning for execution in FY24. The MDA and the Army continue to address THAAD training and component reliability shortfalls. (*emphasis provided*) p.341

The critique of THAAD comes on the heels of Governmental Accountability Office report [“MISSILE DEFENSE: DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of System Sustainment and Readiness”](#) that specifically found the THAAD battery in Guam:

...has insufficient facilities for maintenance work, spares storage, protection from typhoons... (and that the) Army has not constructed new facilities on Guam to protect the unit's equipment from pervasive corrosion. p.14

The 2023 DOT&E report reiterates long-standing concerns about how testing is conducted by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the need for “realistic Intercept flight tests.”

As reported in DOT&E's FY22 Annual Report, the MDA often *designs flight tests to demonstrate a specific new capability, not for operational realism. Operationally realistic intercept flight tests are necessary to provide: 1) needed referent data to support verification, validation, and accreditation of models used in high-fidelity M&S and ground testing; 2) realistic data on multi-element interactions; and 3) data in multi-domain operations. (emphasis provided) p.340.*

Overall, the DOT&E's 2023 report undercut military claims about protecting Guam with missile defense systems and the proposed 360-degree system for Guam.

You don't have to be an expert to understand that in the face of sophisticated attacks, missile defense systems will not protect Guam or even the military facilities in Guam. The fact that the agency in charge of “missile defense” is called out for not even putting these systems to real world tests raises serious doubts about claims of “success.”-  
Robert Underwood PCIS Chair

There is still no effort to protect the civilian population in Guam.

If defense of Guam is an objective in the event of an attack, the U.S. military needs to begin planning on protecting the civilian population. The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese government are making these types of plans, but not a penny of the billions



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for the “Defense of Guam” is directed to shelters, evacuation planning or post-attack community sustainment. More missiles will not protect Guam from other missiles.

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